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Abstract 
In this paper we advocate a new initial allocation mechanism for a tradable pollution permit market. 
We outline a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC) that distributes permits to firms based on their rank 
relative to other firms. This ranking is achieved by ordering firms based on an observable ‘external 
action’ where the external action is an activity or characteristic of the firm that is independent of their 
choice of emissions in the tradeable permit market. We argue that this mechanism has a number of 
benefits over auctioning and grandfathering. Using this mechanism efficiently distributes permits, 
allows for the attainment of a secondary policy objective and has the potential to be more politically 
appealing than existing alternatives. 
Keywords: Rank-order contests; pollution permits; initial allocation  
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1. Introduction	
 
    The key feature of tradeable permit markets is that, in theory, they allow society to achieve 
a given reduction in pollution at the lowest costs to the economy. Under ideal conditions, how 
permits are initially allocated amongst polluting firms will not alter this cost-efficiency 
property. This has led many to view decisions over how to initially allocate permits as being 
mainly decisions about fairness or political expediency, rather than efficiency. Yet the process 
of initial allocation has been shown to be important for cost efficiency when the assumptions 
of a competitive market are relaxed (Hahn, 1984; Stavins, 1995). Further, from a public good 
perspective, Eyckmans et al. (1993) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) have shown that Pareto 
efficiency requires countries’ marginal costs, weighted by their marginal utility of income, to 
be equalised. This suggests that only a certain number of initial permit allocations can 
produce Pareto efficient outcomes (Chichilnisky et al.  2000). This debate takes on much 
greater relevance given the current expansion of tradeable permit schemes world-wide, such 
as Phase Two of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), and the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and Western Climate Initiative schemes in the US.  
The two alternatives for the initial allocation of permits which have been most considered in 
the literature are grandfathering (a free allocation of permits based on historical emissions or 
outputs), and auctioning (Goulder 1995; Parry 1995; Parry et al. 1999; Cramton and Kerr 
2002; Requate 2005). Grandfathering occurs when the regulator freely allocates allowances to 
each firm based on their historical emissions (or perhaps output or some other proxy). 
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Although a popular and frequently-used mechanism, grandfathering is far from an ideal 
allocation mechanism as it is often viewed as politically cumbersome and inefficient (Stavins 
1998; Cramton and Kerr 2002). Firms may have an incentive to lobby the regulator in favour 
of larger permit allocations which, due to the wasteful use of resources in rent-seeking, may 
reduce social welfare in the economy. 
    The main alternative to grandfathering is generally considered to be auctioning. In an 
auction, permits are allocated to each firm based on their monetary bid relative to that of 
every other firm (Lyon 1982; Hahn and Noll 1982; Oehmke 1987; Franciosi et al. 1993; 
Cramton and Kerr 2002). Auctions are often considered to be a ‘lump-sum’ allocation 
mechanism as permits are distributed to each firm independent of their historical emissions. 
Due to this characteristic, auctioning is viewed as a desirable and efficient method of 
allocating permits. However, the main drawback, and as a result, the main reason for the 
infrequent use of auctions is the political difficulty in implementing such a mechanism. As the 
winners in the auction are obliged to pay for their permits, firms’ resistance against 
implementing auctions have been a severe restriction on the implementation of such schemes. 
The financial burden of pollution control to firms under an auction may be as great as under 
an emissions tax (Hanley et al., 2007).1 It is possible to reduce firms’ resistance to auctions by 
redistributing permit auction revenues to the participants (a revenue-neutral auction (Hahn 
and Noll (1982)) or by reducing distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy (the revenue 
recycling effect (Parry 1995; Parry et al. 1999)). However, such schemes are very rarely 
implemented in practice, and may therefore attract little credibility with lobbyists when 
auction schemes are proposed (Goulder, 1995; Pezzy and Park, 1998).  
                                                            
1 Auctioning, however, is slowly becoming an increasingly important and favoured initial allocation mechanism 
in existing tradeable permit markets, such as the US SO₂ `Acid Rain' Program and the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). 
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With problems associated with both grandfathering and auctioning it is therefore desirable to 
try and find alternative mechanisms for the initial allocation of tradeable permits. In fact, the 
literature has rarely considered the use of alternative allocation mechanisms beyond 
grandfathering and auctions. The aim of this paper is to broaden the discussion by outlining 
an alternative allocation mechanism that may be preferred to grandfathering and auctions. 
    Our proposed alternative mechanism, a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC), distributes 
permits to firms based on their rank relative to each other. The ranking is achieved by 
ordering firms based on an observable ‘external action’ where this external action is an 
activity or characteristic of the firm that is independent of their choice of emissions in the 
tradeable permit market. Obtaining a higher ranking is costly to firms. This ranking criterion 
is selected by the regulator who chooses this to meet a secondary policy objective. We argue 
that this mechanism has a number of additional benefits over traditional allocation schemes. 
Similar to auctions, a PAC will efficiently allocate permits in the tradable permit market. 
However, it can simultaneously achieve a secondary policy objective, such as a reduction in 
noise pollution or improvement in corporate social responsibility targets. Given the wide 
variety of possible ranking criteria and secondary policy objectives available, the PAC may 
also be easier to implement in the face of intense interest group pressure than an auction. We 
also find that a PAC avoids some of the problems with grandfathering. 
    The remainder of our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the allocation 
mechanism and the possible benefits of implementing such as scheme. Section 3 discusses the 
regulator’s optimal choice of permit distribution in the PAC, while Section 4 illustrates the 
potential implementation of the mechanism in the European Emissions Trading Scheme. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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2. A	Permit	Allocation	Contest	
 
    To understand how a Permit Allocation Contest has the potential to work in a tradable 
permit market, it is beneficial to consider the different possible types of contest that exist. 
Two main mechanisms exist: rank-order tournaments and rank-order contests. The distinction 
between the two rests on the relationship between agents’ unobservable effort and observable 
actions. Rank-order tournaments are incentive schemes used in situations where firms’ 
performance is observed with some exogenous noise. That is, in rank-order tournaments, it is 
generally assumed that each agent experiences a stochastic relationship between their effort 
and actions. For example, in the control of non-point source pollution, an agent’s effort could 
be in the form of land management changes. The regulator cannot observe these efforts, but 
instead measures the effects of this effort on water quality. Stochastic processes determine the 
relationship between the farmer’s effort, and the consequent impacts on water quality, making 
it difficult for the regulator to infer what the farmer has or has not done. When the observation 
noise is common to all firms, rank-order tournaments typically outperform absolute, or 
individualistic, schemes (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Holmström 1982; Green and Stokey 1983; 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Mookherjee 1984). 
    When there is no individual-specific noise involved in the observation of firms’ actions, 
one can implement a rank-order contest, which is, in effect, a multi-prize all-pay auction 
(Glazer and Hassin 1988; Barut and Kovenock 1998; Clark and Riis 1998; Moldovanu and 
Sela 2001; 2006). This differs from tournaments as agents in rank-order contest models are 
generally assumed to have a deterministic relationship between effort and actions. In a rank-
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order contest, there are a finite number of prizes to be distributed among the participating 
agents, with the size of each prize known before the onset of the contest. Firms compete in 
this contest by submitting costly (monetary or non-monetary) "bids". Firms then are ranked in 
order of their bids, and the "prizes" are distributed to the firms according to firms’ rankings. 
That is, a firm that submits the highest bid is ranked first, and thus gets the largest permit 
allocation ("first prize"), the firm that submits the second-highest bid is ranked second, and 
thus gets second-largest allocation ("second prize"), and so on, up to the firm that submits the 
lowest bid being ranked last, and thus receiving the smallest allocation (possibly nothing). 
Rank-order contests, like tournaments, tend to outperform alternative types of individualistic 
and contract-based regulation. 
    In this paper we discuss the implementation of a rank-order contest. A similar argument can 
also be applied to rank-order tournaments. Our rank-order contest, the Permit Allocation 
Contest, attempts to reach a middle ground between grandfathering and auctioning as an 
initial allocation mechanism. As our model is a type of multi-unit ‘all-pay auction’ it has 
many similarities to a standard permit auction. Yet, as the ranking criterion in the PAC can be 
non-monetary, it can share certain desirable characteristics with a grandfathering mechanism. 
 
2.1	The	allocation	mechanism	
 
    Consider a competitive tradable permit market with n participating firms.2 Within this 
market each firm has the option either to purchase permits from the market or to abate 
                                                            
2 For an analytical exposition of a permit allocation contest see MacKenzie et al. (2008a). 
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pollution. However, each firm must hold enough permits to cover their emissions. The 
regulator has responsibility of initially allocating permits to the participating firms. Aside 
from regulating emissions in a tradable permit market, let us assume the regulator also has a 
secondary (unrelated) objective where the regulator aims to minimise a social ‘bad’ produced 
by all firms in the permit market. This secondary objective could relate to the improvement of 
health and safety incidents, reductions in noise pollution, cuts in other pollutants not related to 
the permit market, or encouraging corporate social responsibility. Therefore, in our model, the 
regulator aims to minimise the aggregate social ‘bad’ (or maximise some social ‘benefit’) by 
using incentives in the form of permit allocations (without the need for standard command 
and control regulation). This turns out to provide an attractive way of allocating permits. 
    The regulator is assumed to have two non-competing policy objectives. Firstly, the 
regulator is motivated to choose a schedule of permit allocations to minimise the aggregate 
abatement cost in the tradeable permit market--the standard permit market regulatory 
objective. Second, the additional objective of the regulator is to provide incentives for the 
permit market firms to achieve some predetermined public policy target linked to the external 
actions of firms which we define as the maximisation of expected aggregate external actions. 
As such, the regulator is not assumed to adopt economic efficiency as its sole criterion: whilst 
it wishes a cost-effective solution to the pollution control problem which the permit market 
addresses, it seeks the biggest improvement in its secondary objective (say, health and safety 
at work). For present purposes, it will be sufficient to assume that the marginal benefits of this 
secondary objective are always bigger than the marginal costs; or that the secondary objective 
is deemed to be desirable on other grounds (e.g. ethical or political). 
    To keep the argument as general as possible, we assume that firms will be ranked on their 
choice of an observable ‘external action’. External actions are those which allow the regulator 
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to meet its secondary objective. To adhere to the regulator’s public policy objective, firm i 
chooses an external ‘action’ (such as reductions in noise pollution) denoted by iz , in which it 
bears a cost  i iv z  where i  is some ‘ability’ parameter. This ability parameter captures 
heterogeneity in firms’ costs, so that a firm with a relatively low i  will be a relatively low-
cost producer.  The external action can be, at the extreme, an invariant characteristic of a firm, 
e.g. population for a country under a global tradeable permit market. However, it is most 
likely that an external factor will be chosen so that firms have the ability to alter their permit 
allocation. The observable ‘external action’ is an activity or characteristic of the firm which is 
independent from its choice of emissions and the permit market. The regulator aims to select 
an appropriate criterion to rank all firms so that the action is independent of emission choices 
and where the aggregate action can fulfil an objective set by the regulator.3 
    In order for firms to obtain a permit allocation, the regulator chooses an ordered schedule 
(vector) of permit allocations, 1 2( , , , )
n
ns s s s      subject to 1 2 0ns s s      and 
1
n
j
j
s E

  where js  is the thj  permit allocation and E is the absolute aggregate emissions cap 
for the tradeable permit market (the regulator’s precise choice of permit allocations will be 
considered later in this paper). Using this permit allocation schedule, the regulator distributes 
a (possibly unequal) permit allocation to each firm whilst ensuring the absolute emissions cap 
is binding. The specific permit allocation to a firm depends on each firm’s size of external 
                                                            
3 In most permit markets, the participation of firms in the permit market is usually dependent on their inclusion 
in a product market e.g. a permit market may require participation of all energy producers. Given the permit 
market participants have similar product markets, it is possible that each firm in the permit market has a number 
of characteristics or `actions' that are comparable amongst all participants, independently chosen from its 
emissions and socially beneficial, which can be used as the external factor. 
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action relative to every other firm, so that firms that have a larger relative size of external 
action obtain a larger permit allocation.4 
    In a PAC, the regulator observes the external actions of all firms and ranks them in 
descending order of their external action where the firm with the highest level of external 
action is ranked first, the second highest firm is ranked second and so on until all firms are 
ranked. Each ranked-ordered firm obtains a corresponding permit allocation so that the firm 
with the top ranking obtains the largest permit allocation 1( )s , the second ranked obtains the 
second highest permit allocation 2( )s  and so on until all individual permit allocations are 
distributed to the firms. 
    Firms are assumed to have different abilities at producing their external action (i.e. different 
costs). In particular, each firm privately knows their ability parameter before the PAC 
commences. Although each firm knows its own ability parameter and the distribution of 
ability parameters for its competitors, no firm knows the actual realization of its rivals’ ability 
parameters. The regulator is assumed to also know the distribution of abilities, but not the 
individual ability level of each firm. Similarly, although the permit allocation schedule (the 
rule by which initial allocations are determined) is common knowledge, each firm’s actual 
permit allocation is uncertain at the time of the decision-making. In other words, by 
participating in PAC, all firms engage in a game of incomplete information. Given its 
knowledge of own ability i , of the distribution of abilities, and of schedule of permit 
                                                            
4 The regulator must choose an external action that is feasible for the tradeable permit market. In addition, if the 
industry exhibits increasing returns to scale, a regulator could allocate permits based on how each firm's present 
external action compares to its own past external action - e.g. based on the percentage reduction of noise 
pollution over time. However, scale effects will be captured by the form of the cost function described later. To 
avoid size effects, it is likely the regulator could use changes in external action throughout time, for example, the 
relative reduction of noise pollution over time. 
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allocations, each firm uses its expectations of permit allocation to choose an optimal level of 
external action. Obviously, firm i ’s optimal choice will be monotonic in ability i , so that a 
firm with lower ability parameter i will choose a higher optimal level of external action. 
 
    Firms’ optimal external actions are determined by a number of factors. First, the shape (or 
curvature) of the cost function (.)v  is an important determinant of the level of external action 
chosen by each firm. Indeed, the ‘less’ convex a firm’s cost function, the higher the optimal 
external action. Second, a higher market equilibrium permit price would lead to each firm 
choosing a higher external action, since the expected value of prizes is now higher. Third, 
since a general increase in the regulator’s schedule of permit allocations would typically 
increase the permit allocation that a firm can get by moving one rank up, such a general 
increase will provide firms with stronger incentives to increase the optimal external action. 
This might result from a fall in the number of firms who will be allocated permits. 
Furthermore, an increase in the number of firms, as well as certain changes in the distribution 
of abilities may also lead to higher optimal external actions. 
 
3. What’s	good	about	a	Permit	Allocation	Contest?	
 
    Having outlined the nature of the PAC, we now review some of the advantages of this 
approach to permit allocation, relative to auctions or grandfathering. By applying the seminal 
work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), Govindasamy et al. (1994) advocated the use of a 
tournament to control non-point pollution, whereby each polluting firm is ranked by its input 
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use or pollution abatement effort. Govindasamy et al. (1994) found that a tournament can 
work well as it can achieve the same efficiency conditions as a Pigouvian tax but with less 
costly information requirements. Shogren and Hurley (1997) experimentally tested a 
tournament reward system to consider the implication for environmental policy (for example, 
they considered Coasian bargaining and environmental conflict) and found that using such a 
reward system made the experiment participants behave in a similar manner to theoretical 
predictions (for example, the Coasian bargaining outcome was achieved). They showed that 
tournaments reached the theoretical outcomes quicker than other "standard" mechanisms 
which suggests tournaments systems can provide robust incentives to effectively implement 
environmental regulation 
 
3.1	Stronger	incentives	to	invest	in	actions	to	reduce	other	"bads"	
 
    In a PAC, the decisions regarding the number and size of permit allocations has a 
substantially different effect on the incentives of each firm compared to alternative 
mechanisms, such as a ‘winner-pays’ auction. The permit allocations in a PAC are not 
directly related to the firms’ external actions, but instead they are determined by firms’ 
rankings according to the size of their external actions. Thus, a small increase in the firm’s 
external actions may result in a disproportionately large change in permit allocation. For 
example, a small increase in external action by the second-ranked firm could make this firm 
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the winner of the contest, and thus lead to the largest permit allocation (which is typically 
made to be substantially larger than the "second prize").5 
    Moreover, as Krishna and Morgan (1997) showed, all-pay auctions tend to generate higher 
aggregate bids than their winner-pay counterparts, that is, traditional permit auctions. In 
addition, as Moldovanu and Sela (2001) showed, when the prize structure is suitably chosen, 
such a contest will tend to generate the largest aggregate bids (in our case, the largest 
improvement in the secondary objective). As the choice of external action at the margin can 
significantly alter a firm’s permit allocation, the robust incentives created in the PAC system 
should induce all firms to increase their external action. 
 
3.2	Flexible	options	for	the	regulator	in	improve	policy	acceptability	
 
    As the ranking criterion need not be monetary in value, a wide variety of possible external 
actions can exist (any action that is independent of emissions choices is admissible). It follows 
that one may be chosen so that the pollution permit scheme is more politically acceptable for 
the regulator, market participants and the wider economy. Consequently, a PAC system has 
the possibility of being implemented in a wide variety of tradeable permit market contexts. 
For instance, a PAC could be implemented in an international permit market where the 
participating countries are allocated permits (or a burden is assigned to each country) based 
on their (country) external actions, such as the proportion of recycling in each country. The 
system could also be adapted to smaller markets, such as firms choosing external actions 
based on their improvement in noise pollution. Every tradeable permit market has 
                                                            
5 This frequently happens in sport tournaments where the difference between prizes (and notably between first 
and second prizes) is non-linearly increasing (Szymanski, 2003). 
13 
 
heterogeneous circumstances in which it operates and with a PAC, public policy objectives 
(and external actions) can be chosen to compliment the social ‘norms’ and prevailing political 
opinion in the specific emissions trading scheme. In contrast, although auctioning and 
grandfathering can be used in all tradeable permit markets, the only allocation criterion 
available is the comparison of firms’ money ‘bids’ and historical emissions, respectively. The 
lack of other possible allocation criterion may make implementation more difficult. 
 
3.3	Political	benefits	
 
    Using a PAC in a tradeable permit market offers the political benefit of having a clear 
connection between permit allocations (including the differences between them) and some 
socially beneficial firm action. This avoids one criticism of grandfathering, namely that it 
results in polluters being rewarded with valuable permits for their previous polluting actions: 
heavy polluters typically being awarded more permits at the start of the market than less 
polluting firms. It is possible that a PAC system may actually appear fairer to a number of 
groups in society than alternative mechanisms as it couples permit allocation (a reward to the 
firms) with efforts towards attaining some other public policy objective. In contrast, 
grandfathering permits creates a perverse link between emissions and the value of permits 
each firm receives.6 
    Similar to the auctioning of permits, a PAC takes an ‘instrumentalist’ perspective in that it 
ignores past and current permit holdings when determining permit allocations (Raymond 
                                                            
6 The equitable issues associated with permit allocation are notoriously under researched in economics, mainly 
due to the normative aspects involved (Raymond, 2003). All allocation mechanisms can appear `fair' as it very 
much depends on the attitude to property and the specific circumstances, i.e. an industry level or global 
emissions trading scheme. 
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2003). Therefore, this type of allocation approach treats all firms equally in that firms who 
invest early in pollution abatement are not implicitly punished (as would happen under a 
grandfathering scheme). However, unlike an auction, a PAC mechanism can be adapted so 
non-monetary criteria are used to rank the firms which may be more appealing to participating 
firms than an auction.  
One potentially politically difficult situation may involve a "small" player being "awarded" 
the "big" prize, and the "big" player performing so badly in the contest that it receives no 
allocation. To avoid this problem, it may be necessary to "adjust" the external action for the 
"size" of the player, where the "size" of the player is taken to be either exogenous or 
prohibitively expensive to change (e.g. population size). 
 
3.4	The	existence	of	an	appropriate	external	factor	
 
    Although a PAC distribution mechanism has a number of possible advantages over 
alternative mechanisms, a limitation of a PAC is that the external action must be defined in an 
appropriate manner. As noted above, an optimal external action has to be independent of 
emissions so that no distortions are created in the permit market whilst simultaneously being 
politically acceptable and observable to the regulator. The ease with which an external action 
can be chosen crucially depends on the specific institutional context of the permit market. For 
instance, when the market participants are countries such as in an international permit market, 
it may be relatively easy to find an external action that is both socially beneficial and 
independent of emissions. Countries in a carbon dioxide permit market, such as the EU-ETS, 
could be ranked on the proportional reduction of landfill waste from the non-permit trading 
sector (or the production of methane from the landfilling of wastes), or on some social goal 
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such as reductions in road traffic accidents, or the percentage of firms signing up to Corporate 
Social Responsibility agreements. 
  
3.5	Contest	as	a	reward	and	a	punishment	mechanism	
 
    Another important feature of the contest is that the optimal allocation schedule contains a 
built-in "punishment" for the players who do not perform well and provides a reward for those 
players that perform relatively better. Thus, if the external action has a popular and political 
support (e.g. noise reduction, or poverty reduction actions, etc.), then it might be politically 
acceptable that the player which does so badly in this external action is "penalized" by 
receiving no permits whereas players that perform relatively well obtain a positive initial 
allocation of permits. In other words, the contest can also be used to assign penalties to under-
performing players. 
4. The	regulator’s	optimal	choice	of	allocations	
 
    In a PAC, the regulator has the ability to allocate permits based on a criterion that it 
chooses. We now look into how the regulator can maximize the aggregate external actions 
1
n
i
i
T s

   to achieve its secondary objective by choosing an appropriate permit allocation 
schedule; and at how this relates to the subsequent operation of the tradeable permit market. 
    As Glazer and Hassin (1988) and Barut and Kovenock (1998) showed, to maximise the 
aggregate external action, the lowest-ranked permit allocation ns  must involve zero permits. 
If this did not occur there would be an incentive for firms with ‘weaker’ abilities to reduce 
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their level of external action and obtain a positive level of permit allocation. Choosing a 
vector of permit allocations with 0ns   will induce each firm to choose a non-zero level of 
external action. In essence, we need ( 1)n   non-zero permit allocations. If the firm who is 
ranked last still expects to receive a permit allocation, no matter how small, then this produces 
an incentive to take no action. 
    Some general insights to the mechanism design problem were provided by Moldovanu and 
Sela (2001; 2006). In particular, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) showed that when costs 
functions are linear or concave, it is optimal to allocate the prize "pie" to only a single "first" 
prize. They also showed when cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be 
optimal. As is known in the theoretical literature, only the "allocation distance" between 
neighbouring-ranked permit allocations 1j js s   is important for firms’ incentives. That is, 
what is important for firm i ’s choice of the external action iz  is how many more permits a 
thj  
ranked firm could have obtained from moving one rank up to rank 1j  , rather than the 
absolute levels of permit allocations js  and 1js  . Thus, one of the important questions to be 
addressed is whether an optimal allocation schedule involves consequently ranked allocations 
which are equal to each other. To see this, let us think what happens to firm i ’s choice of the 
external action iz  when an allocation js  increases. For 2 1j n   , any unit increase in an 
allocation js  for the firm i ’s choice of the external action iz  (or the “marginal effect” of an 
allocation js ) has two effects. First, as js  increases, this decreases the "upward distance" 
1j js s  , and thus has a negative "upward distance" effect for the firm i ’s choice of the 
external action iz . Second, as js  increases, the "downward distance" 1j js s   increases, so 
that the "downward distance" effect is positive for the external action iz . Given this we can 
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immediately see that 1s , the first permit allocation, has only positive marginal effects. That is, 
1s  only has a "downward distance" effect for the firm i ’s choice of the external action iz , 
which means increasing the first allocation will result in aggregate external actions increasing. 
In contrast, the last permit allocation ns  only has a negative "upward distance" effect, which 
means increasing the lowest allocation will result in a reduction in aggregate external actions. 
As the marginal effect of ns  is negative, it is sufficient to require that the bottom-ranked 
allocation ns  is equal to zero. 
    For a tradable permit market with n  firms, a regulator would maximise a secondary 
objective whilst efficiently allocating permits to the market if only ( 1)n   permit allocations 
were distributed. This would incentivise low ability firms to select a positive level of external 
actions, as noted above. Given the allocations are uncertain at the point of deciding a level of 
allocation, all firms will participate as their expected value of permit allocation is significantly 
large. Note this expected value has the ability of being altered by the regulator’s selection of 
permit allocations. As the lowest ranked firm obtains no permits from the contest, the firm 
will, as in a normal competitive market, abate pollution up to the point at which their marginal 
abatement cost is equated to the permit price. 
    One popular permit allocation schedule discussed in tradeable permit market literature 
involves an egalitarian distribution of permits across all firms or countries (Raymond 2003). 
For example, allocating an equal number of permits per capita has been strongly advocated as 
a distributional rule for an international permit market (Kverndokk 1995; Rose et al. 1998). 
While some form of egalitarian allocation may have a number of merits, it may not be 
desirable to achieve the second policy objective. To see this, consider an extreme egalitarian 
allocation where firms obtain identical number of permits independent of all firms’ actions or 
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characteristics -- a ‘pure’ lump-sum approach, i.e. 1 2 1j j ns s s s s       (in other 
words, all "allocation distances" are zero). In such a scenario, the regulator’s schedule of 
permit allocations is , , ,egal E E Es
n n n
     , where each firm in the PAC obtains an identical 
share of the aggregate emissions cap. This means that the distribution of permits is 
independent of each firm’s choice of external action, and that no incentive exists for firms to 
choose a positive level of external action. In policy terms, this type of egalitarian approach 
should not be chosen if the regulator wants to combine the permit allocation of a tradeable 
permit market with a secondary public policy objective. For a regulator to succeed in this 
secondary public policy objective, it must instead choose a schedule of permit allocations that 
discriminates in favour of firms with larger external actions and against those with smaller 
actions. 
 
4.1	Example:	the	case	of	four	firms	
 
       Here, we will investigate the relationship between firm i ’s optimal choice of the external 
action iz  and the permit allocation schedule 1 2( , , , )ns s s . As MacKenzie et al. (2008) show, 
firm i ’s equilibrium choice of the external action iz  can be represented as 
1( ( ))i iz v y  , 
where v(.) is an arbitrary convex cost function and ( )iy   is a function capturing both the 
distribution of the ability parameter i  and the permit allocation schedule. Since v(.) is a 
strictly increasing function, an increase in ( )iy  would result in an increase in the external 
action iz . While due to non-linearity of the cost function, the analysis of the effects of 
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changes in an allocation js  is non-trivial, the effect of such change on function iy  may 
provide us with some insight into the effects of such changes on the choice of iz .  
 
We consider a simple case, assuming a uniform distribution of firms' abilities i  with support 
1 ,1
2
     where firms have cost functions:  
2
i i i iv z z   . Recall that the bottom-ranked permit 
allocation ns  is set equal to zero. As Figure 1a shows, the effect on firms’ external actions iy  
of a unit increase in the top allocation 1s  (or the marginal effect of 1s )  is the highest for the 
lowest-cost firms (low  ). On the other hand, the marginal effect on firms’ external actions 
of the second-ranked allocation 2s  peaks out for the mid-range costs, and the effect for the 
third-ranked allocation 3s  peaks out for the relatively higher-cost firms, and, moreover, the 
heights of the peaks are similar. This, together with the convexity of costs, suggests a 
possibility that it might be optimal to set the third-ranked allocation 3s  equal to the second-
ranked allocation 2s .   
     
       
Figure 1 a) b) and c) here 
      
Figure 1 Case of 4n  , [1/ 2,1]i U   : a) the total marginal effects (y) of allocations 1 2,s s  and 3s  (the 
solid red curve, the narrowly dashed blue curve, and the widely dashed green curve, respectively), as a function 
of the cost parameter ia ; b) the aggregate external action T  as a function of the top-ranked allocation 1s  for 
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3 0s  , 2 1s E s  ; c) the aggregate external action T  as a function of the second-ranked allocation 2s  for 
1 2
Es  , 3 22
Es s   (for 1E  , price=1). 
 
   To show this, let us first check what happens to the aggregate external actions 
1
n
i
i
T s

  if 
we set the third-ranked allocation s₃ equal to zero. Setting 3 0s   allows us to express the 
middle allocation as 2 1s E s  , with 1 ,3
Es E     . In this case, as Figure 1b suggests, the 
expected aggregate external action has a maximum around 1 2
Es  . In other words, here it is 
not optimal to allocate the entire "pie" of permit allocations only to a single top-ranked firm, 
i.e. we need that 1s E . Furthermore, if we now set the top-ranked allocation equal to a half 
of the pie (so that 3 22
Es s  ), the Figure 1c confirms that it would be optimal to set the third-
ranked allocation to be equal to the second-ranked allocation, i.e. 2 3s s . Thus, the optimal 
allocation schedule for four firms and costs distributed uniformly on 1 ,1
2
    , will be 
approximately equal to 1 2 3 4, , 02 4
E Es s s s    . 
Performing similar manipulations for costs distributed uniformly on [1,5], we find that the 
optimal allocation schedule for four firms will be approximately equal to 
1 2 3 4
4 , , 0
5 10
E Es s s s     (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 a) b) and c) here 
 
Figure 2 Case of 4n  , [1,5]i U   : a) the total marginal effects ( y ) of allocations 1 2,s s  and 3s  (the 
solid red curve, the narrowly dashed blue curve, and the widely dashed green curve, respectively), as a function 
of the cost parameter i ; b) the aggregate external action T  as a function of the top-ranked allocation 1s  for 
3 0s  , 2 1s E s  ; c) the aggregate external action T  as a function of the second-ranked allocation 2s  for 
1
4
5
Es  , 3 25
Es s   (for 1E  , price=1). 
 
    Similarly, we found that for other uniform distributions, the pattern is similar, i.e. the 
highest expected aggregate external action happens when there is a relatively large top 
allocation, followed by two equal allocations, with the bottom allocation being zero. For 
example, for 1[ ,1]
3i
U   , we have that 1 2 3 43 , , 05 5
E Es s s s    ; for [1,2]U  - 
1 2 3 4, , 02 4
E Es s s s    ; [1,10]U  - 1 2 3 49 , , 010 20
E Es s s s    . While our numerical 
findings may not be robust with respect to the shape of the distribution and the number of 
firms, we are however able to show, similarly to Moldovanu and Sela (2001), that the optimal 
allocation schedule in the presence of convex costs need not be very discriminatory, possibly 
exhibiting equal consecutively-ranked allocations. However, our work also suggests a 
possibility that the optimal allocation schedules will tend to involve the top allocation 1s  to be 
larger than the lower-ranked allocations. 
    This case is instructive, as it shows some important features of contests. Here, in order to 
"lift off" the external action by the relatively high-cost firms, the regulator may need to award 
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a positive middle allocation. However, at the margin, the middle allocation is less effective for 
the relatively low-cost firms. Thus, if the realized sample of firms’ costs parameters consists 
only of relatively high cost parameters, the ex-post optimal schedule should involve equal top 
and middle allocations. If, instead, the realized sample of firms’ costs parameters consists 
only of relatively low cost parameters, the ex-post optimal schedule should only involve a 
single top allocation. 
5. Potential	applications	to	the	EU‐ETS	
 
    To illustrate the many possible applications of the PAC permit allocation mechanism, we 
discuss the possible consequences for implementing in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU-ETS). The EU-ETS was the first emissions trading scheme in the world to set 
compulsory CO2 targets. Commencing in 2005 with phase periods 2005-2007 and 2008-2012, 
aggregate emissions of participating (trading) sectors such as energy, cement, glass paper and 
pulp, were capped. This resulted in nearly 12,000 installations being regulated which 
produced 46% of the total EU CO2 emissions (Watanabe and Robinson, 2005). To implement 
a PAC, we discuss two possible scenarios where (i) firms participate in the PAC to obtain 
permit allocation and (ii) members states participate in a PAC to obtain a level of overall 
aggregate emissions. 
    Consider a PAC where the participants are firms within the EU-ETS. Let us first assume 
that the PAC is decentralised to each member state. Within a PAC, the participating firms 
would be ranked in order of their external action. For the EU-ETS, the external action may be 
chosen by each member states to achieve a secondary policy objective which is entirely 
focused on Member States’ preferences. For example, corporate and social responsibility may 
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be a requirement. This may be politically appealing for Member states with unique policy 
requirements. Allowing the decentralisation of the PAC may have the potential to cause 
strategic behaviour in the choice of a secondary policy objective. For instance, a Member 
State may choose a relatively "easy" secondary objective, where their firms have relatively 
low cost in completing an action and hence reduce the cost of obtaining permits. However, the 
PAC can deal with this issue by ranking firms such that the absolute level of external actions 
no longer matters. Another possibility is for the PAC to be centralised within the EU-ETS. In 
such a case, the European Commission selects the external action and secondary public 
policy. This may be beneficial due to the prevention of strategic behaviour by Member states. 
Moreover, the European Commission can focus on a specific requirement that it values as 
important for all firms in the EU-ETS, for example, the reduction in noise pollution, or the 
improvement of health and safety at work. By allowing firms to participate in a PAC, many 
possible secondary benefits can be produced, whilst avoiding the problems of grandfathering 
and auctions. However, it may be difficult to select an external action as not all firms may 
share sufficient characteristics in terms of the secondary objective. 
    One other possibility is to allow Member states to participate in the PAC. Currently, the 
Kyoto Protocol allows economic regions, such as the EU, to legitimately act, sign and ratify 
the convention (and any future protocols) on a EU scale whilst using internal procedures to 
differentiate targets amongst the member states. In other words, the EU was allowed to create 
a ‘bubble’ where the burden of a common EU target could be redistributed between member 
states---commonly known as the Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA) (Phylipsen et al., 1998; 
Ringius, 1999; Lacasta et al., 2002). After significantly costly and drawn-out political 
discussions an agreement was reached in 1998 where European carbon dioxide emissions 
would, in net, reduce by 8 per cent of 1990 levels. An alternative to the BSA is to introduce a 
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PAC to determine the carbon dioxide reduction burden each member state has to bear. The 
European Commission could outline a contest in which lower burdens of carbon dioxide 
reduction are awarded to higher-ranked member states in a PAC. Ranking member states on 
some criterion would be relatively simple. For example, ranking could be based on member 
states’ non-permit trading sectors improvements in pollution from domestic transport, 
pollution from landfills, recycling, and so on. So long as the criterion avoids correlations 
between actions and carbon dioxide abatement activities in the permit market, then the PAC is 
an efficient allocation mechanism. Additionally, the Europe Commission can focus on 
inducing Member States to comply with other EU regulations e.g. reduction in landfill waste, 
improving water quality and so on. Instead of allocation being based purely on political 
factors, allowing the PAC to distribute abatement burdens rewards Member States who have 
successfully produced actions that benefit the European Commission’s other public policy 
objectives. 
 
6. Conclusions	
 
    The objective of this paper was to outline a new type of permit allocation mechanism. In 
our model, the initial allocation of tradeable pollution permits is done via a Permit Allocation 
Contest (PAC). A PAC is a rank-order contest in which the firms are allocated permits 
according to the ordinal rank of the size of their external action. This is an activity or 
characteristic of the participating firms that is independent of emissions choices, and which 
contributes towards achieving a secondary social objective. 
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    In our model, the regulator was assumed to have two policy objectives. First, by allocating 
permits based on the external action (rather than based on emissions), the regulator aims to 
minimise the aggregate cost of reducing emissions through avoiding interference with the 
least-cost potential of a tradeable permit market. Second, by choosing a suitable permit 
allocation schedule (i.e. the number of permits that firms can obtain by being ranked first, 
second, and so on), the regulator aims to fulfil a secondary public policy objective, requiring 
maximisation of the aggregate actions, such as improvements in health and safety policies, 
corporate and social responsibility or noise pollution. Since, by construction, the permit 
allocation schedule is independent of emissions, the allocation mechanism results in cost-
effective permit market, in contrast to the outcome under updated grandfathering (MacKenzie 
et al, 2008b). Moreover, the PAC avoids the issues of rewarding firms for past emissions 
(associated with grandfathering), whilst allowing for the regulator to avoid the financial 
burdens which a conventional permit auction would impose on industry. 
    We considered an incomplete information game PAC, where the permit allocation schedule 
as well as the cost distribution are publicly known, but where each firm’s cost parameter for 
its external actions is private information. To obtain the public policy objective, the regulator 
must choose an optimal permit allocation schedule. We find that an egalitarian allocation 
schedule (whereby firms obtain identical permit allocations regardless of their external action) 
cannot achieve the public policy objective as an egalitarian allocation schedule leads to zero 
aggregate external actions. Instead, for the secondary public policy objective to be achieved, 
the schedule must be discriminatory - at least for the lower-ranked permit allocations. Our 
numerical analysis is in accordance with these theoretical results. It shows that for the 
maximum aggregate external actions to be obtained, the lowest-ranked permit allocation has 
to be zero, and, when costs of external actions are convex, the higher-ranked permit 
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allocations have to be less discriminatory. This paper provides guidance for policymakers on 
how to implement a PAC and select an optimal permit allocation schedule for a public policy 
objective. In particular, we have shown that the regulator’s optimal permit allocation schedule 
will depend extensively on the structure and distribution of firms’ costs, which must be taken 
into consideration when implementing a PAC. 
    A PAC, at its simplest, has attempted to reach the middle ground between grandfathering 
and auctioning. On one hand, a PAC creates similar incentives to an auction and could, in 
theory, efficiently allocate permits. On the other hand, it has features of grandfathering as it 
does not require politically unpopular monetary bids, and thus reduces the financial burden of 
regulation to industry. While a PAC does require other forms of expenditure, a suitably 
designed PAC may require expenditure on socially-beneficial activities which firms are 
already pursuing even in the absence of a PAC, or which firms may find to attractive to 
pursue. Thus, a suitable designed PAC may be both politically feasible and economically 
attractive. In addition, a PAC is a flexible mechanism as it allows a ranking of firms using a 
wide variety of external actions, and thus could be adapted to a variety of industrial and 
regional circumstances. Moreover, a PAC involves a clear rule of prize allocation (i.e. no 
regulator’s subjective judgement is involved, no rent-seeking is induced), and is easily 
adaptable to changing market and technological conditions. 
    One possible practical difficulty of implementation of a PAC lies in the identification and 
implementation of a suitable external action. This is because in order for the PAC to achieve 
efficiency, the external action must be independent of emissions, and in addition it has to be 
politically agreeable to firms, the regulator and politicians. It might be difficult to identify an 
external action that satisfies all these requirements. However, we hope that further research 
will help to overcome these identification and implementation problems. 
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